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INTRODUCTION
Because law exists as a system1 of principles, institutions, procedures, and
professions, law’s network effects2 must be understood in order accurately to
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Professor, Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong; Executive Director, Centre for
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Coendet, Mike Klausner, Jhy-An Lee, Ryan Mitchell, Katharina Pistor, Ching-Ping Shao, and Wang-Ruu
Tseng for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. All errors remain my own.
1
Historical surveys of opinions regarding law’s systematic quality have recently been assembled by
Gerald Postema and Jeremy Waldron. See Gerald J. Postema, Law’s System: The Necessity of System in
Common Law, 2014 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 69, 105 (2014) (“[T]there is in the common-law tradition a
deep commitment to system and the importance of systematic, reflective thinking in and about law.”);
and Jeremy Waldron, Transcendental Nonsense and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 47 (2000)
(“The conceptual terminology of legal doctrine . . . . must be understood as a sort of neutral matrix on
which their interlocking relations can be laid out without any assumption that the various elements were,
so to speak, made for one another.”). The concept of “legal system” has been parsed in great detail by
Catherine Valcke. CATHERINE VALCKE, COMPARING LAW: COMPARATIVE LAW AS RECONSTRUCTION
OF COLLECTIVE COMMITMENTS, Chapter 60–89 (2018).
2
“A [network] is, in its simplest form, a collection of points joined together in pairs by lines. In the
jargon of the field the points are referred to as vertices or nodes and the lines are referred to as edges.
Many objects of interest in the physical, biological, and social sciences can be thought of as networks . . .”
M. E. J. NEWMAN, NETWORKS: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2010) (footnote omitted). Network “effects arise
where current users of a good gain when additional users adopt it … new entry, especially against
established networks with proprietary technology, is often nearly impossible.” Paul Klemperer, Network
Goods (Theory), in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2008). Network benefits or
externalities save coordination costs for the user of the network. Although expressed in different
terminology, the connection between the forms provided by law and market coordination to create
network effects is already discussed by Ronald Coase. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA: NEW SERIES 386, 386, 389–91 (1937). This connection between Coase’s work and network
externalities appears to have been first noted by Jason Johnston. Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of
The Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 242 (1993).
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assess its utility qua network to those who read and apply it separately from its
substantive quality. The desirability of specific terms in a law or contract to the
user has already been thoughtfully analyzed as a function of network effects.
With a series of papers beginning in the mid-1990s, Klausner offered a coherent
model of network effects when discussing choices by incorporators or other
contracting parties between leading law or default clauses and custom drafting.3
He found that network effects make contract terms embedded within a robust
network more valuable to the user and can contradict efficient innovation. In
papers appearing around 2000, Pistor applied a comparable analysis to the
limited options of developing countries when offered standardized foreign,
national, or international “best practice” legal principles.4 From a community of
professional support to a web of semantic stability, network effects facilitate and
overshadow socially congruent chthonic norms by standardizing “best
practices.” Is this overshadowing important? In a separate body of literature
examining the systems, families, and traditions of law, systems theorists have
modelled the genesis of such chthonic legal systems. This approach has not only
been presented by Luhmann, 5 and explained well by Teubner, 6 but has also
recently and forcefully been carried forward by Valcke. 7 According to their
view, law should be conceived in its systematically interrelated nature as a
network of self-generating (autopoietic) relational concepts that is deeply
interlinked with its social environment.8
Law thus finds its underlying impetus in social expectations, but takes the
form of an internally coherent system of responses. This system becomes
increasingly independent as a linguistic product through propagation of concepts

3
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757,
764 (1995) [hereinafter Networks of Contracts]. (“[N]etwork externalities introduce the possibility that
corporate contracts that maximize individual firm values will not be socially optimal . . . . Second, if
network externalities are significant, corporate law may perform a coordinating function similar to that
of technical standards in such fields as telecommunications, computing, accounting, engineering, and
many other industries and professions.”); Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law:
A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 796 (2006) [hereinafter Contractarian Theory] (“[A] plausible
inference is that both learning and network externalities have played and continue to play a role in driving
firms toward Delaware incorporation and the plain vanilla charter.”).
4
Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 97, 104–05 (2002) (“Once a regulatory system has established a head start over others, it
benefits from rules that can be interpreted and applied only within that regulatory regime. Superior legal
expertise of attorneys and judges is an important asset that is not easily emulated by other jurisdictions.
Developing rules that require their expertise can reinforce this advantage.”).
5
Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 136, 138 (1989) (“The legal system
is a differentiated functional system within society. Thus, in its own operations, the legal system is
continually engaged in carrying out the self-reproduction (autopoiesis) of the overall social system as
well as its own.”) (emphasis omitted).
6
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 45–46 (1993).
7
VALCKE, supra note 1, at 139 (“Whereas most legal theorists recognize that purpose-definition, like
content-building more generally, is achieved within the systems, they nonetheless insist on separating
these functions. Hart distinguishes ‘primary’ from ‘secondary’ rules; Dworkin describes the ‘preinterpretive’ and ‘interpretive’ stages of legal interpretation sequentially. In contrast, Luhmann insists
that the purpose-defining operations are, in autopoietic unlike in other organic systems, qualitatively
indistinguishable from the systems’ other operations . . . . I would suggest that legal practice everywhere
largely bears out Luhmann’s insight on this point.”).
8
NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 464 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., trans. Klaus A.
Ziegert trans., 2004) (“We know that law operates in society, performs society, fulfils a social function,
and has been differentiated to fulfil this function by its autopoietic reproduction.”).
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and remedies forming the network of law.9 Law, like language, is ultimately “a
structured system … both a self-contained whole and a principle of
classification.”10 Although the content of a legal system’s norm network exists
as a self-contained whole, it arises in a close relationship with its socio-political
environment to create the conceptually interdependent arrangement of rights and
obligations referred to as law. Because it exists as a network of norms, each
additional person using this norm network will make it more attractive to users
and correspondingly detract from the utility of competing networks. As Grewal
explains, “when a user switches from one network to another, she will not only
increase the value of the network she joins, but will also decrease the value of
her previous network by leaving it with one fewer member.”11
Two significant consequences of bringing these insights together are, first,
that use of nodes taken from a foreign (or even an old) network will mean
assumption of the socio-political characteristics embedded in that legal system’s
genesis, and second, that use of such foreign (or old) network nodes could well
mean sacrificing systematic congruence between a jurisdiction’s legal and social
systems. When a jurisdiction esteems law on the basis of network effects, it risks
creating a legal system that is quickly and generally understood but exists
detached from the guiding impetus of its jurisdiction’s own social needs.
Network effects have great explanatory power for how law spreads in an
international context where competing legal systems meet, particularly for the
attempts of smaller or late-entry jurisdictions to innovate legally. Some aspects
have been explained well through individual case studies, but the general
phenomenon of network dynamics should be understood as a characteristic of
all legal development. One such case is the dominance of Delaware corporation
law, where network dynamics have been shown to have a key role in effective
regulatory competition.12 In the debate on the nature of the corporation as a
nexus of contracts, Klausner has painstakingly laid out the potentially distorting
nature of network effects for efficient choice.13 In the context of colonization
and globalization, the systemic “transplant” effect, whereby local demand for
remedies and institutions may not match standardized law, has also been
examined in detail.14 This examination of dominant legal systems overtaking

9
It is the professionally self-reflective transition from the first set of relationships (society stimulating
legal actors) to the relative independence of the second set of relationships (legal actors providing
solutions for society) that constitutes “autopoiesis.” Id. at 174–75.
10
FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 11 (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.,
trans. 2013).
11
DAVID S. GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 26 (2008).
12
Network of Contracts, supra note 3, at 848 (“The network externality model may explain this
uniformity . . . . [O]nce one firm’s product has emerged as dominant . . . other firms have incentives to
produce ‘compatible’ products[,] . . . [so that] users can avail themselves of network benefits available to
users of the dominant product.”). See also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
LAW (1993); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 594 (2003).
13
Networks of Contracts, supra note 3, at 849–50.
14
As will be discussed in Part IV, Pistor expressed the general problem of general foreign law against
specific local law very early, but limits her focus to the web of subsidiary institutions, such as enforcement
mechanisms, that underlie and buttress core law and the conceptual network that allows law to be
understood and applied. See Pistor, supra note 4, at 98. See also Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor &
Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 189 (2003) (focusing on the
necessity of respecting a jurisdiction’s institutional framework and the value of local participation therein).
This paper argues that the analysis is improved when the overall legal system is conceived as “system”
and the interaction among systems is conceived as a product of network effects.
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developing legal systems comes close to the analysis offered in this paper, but
stops short of embracing the systems theoretic understanding of law’s essential
origin in its own social environment;15 it also does not expressly apply a network
effects analysis in the international context. The accumulated insights on
competition through network effects and standardization should be combined
with the system theorist’s view of law as an autopoietic system within larger
social systems. The consequence is to offer a robust understanding of law’s
origin that also allows a clear view of how legal systems compete with and
overtake each other. It also brings to light a potential behavioral bias in economic
development planning, as a focus on the value of law’s network effects can serve
to eclipse a search for law’s congruence with existing social needs.16
For a time, persons living within a dominant network might view their
condition as an “end of history” because network dominance resembles
complete convergence on an ideal embodied in their own legal system. 17
Viewing the historical reality of local conditions, however, there is little concrete
evidence that such convergence on perfection has, will, or can be achieved –
either as proclaimed by Hegel in nineteenth-century Europe18 or as argued by
Fukuyama in twentieth-century America. 19 Supplanting local law with a
dominant legal network also entails risk. Short-term savings gained through
reduced international coordination and support costs for the ready-made could
eventually lead to long-term incongruence between such law and social needs as
the design of solutions for deep-seated social expectations is side-stepped. 20
This evolutionary pattern is discussed in Part IV.
Absent a fortuitous, perfect match between the law that a jurisdiction would
create locally and the dominant network being adopted, using an off-the-rack
framework could both stymie innovation in legal solutions and deny late-comers
the opportunity to shape local and global law to meet their own preferences. In
this market for law, swapping locally adapted concepts that are not broadly
known, and are thus internationally “illiquid,” 21 for the “liquid” concepts that

15

The systems theory presented in this paper is that of Niklas Luhmann, and is discussed in detail in
Part III.A.
16
Locally, growing use could lead to growing litigation so that even more social expectations feed
into the legal system, but this would not be the case where a jurisdiction borrows off-the-rack foreign or
“globalized” law because of its strong network effects.
17
It has also been powerfully argued that such complement between a network of ideas about how to
behave (heuristics) and a specific economic environment to which they are well-adapted can constitute
an economic balance viewed as a perfectly efficient market. However, when external conditions of the
market change and the heuristic tools built into theoretical network for investment decisions no longer fit
these conditions, the mal-adaption of the old heuristics is seen as “irrational” rather than “efficient.” See
ANDREW W. LO, Adaptive Markets in Action, ADAPTIVE MARKETS: FINANCIAL EVOLUTION AT THE
SPEED OF THOUGHT 269 (2016).
18
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 197 (HB Nisbet
trans., 1975).
19
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 338–39 (2nd ed. 2006).
20
This paper focuses on the network phenomenon in space, as a network originating in one location
reaches the tipping point and becomes regionally or globally dominant. However, the same or a similar
network phenomenon occurs in time, as an older and better-known body of legal solutions snowballs
forward, becoming easier and easier to use and understand. Thus, the analysis offered here could also—
with minor adjustments— provide a network view of how ‘conservative’ or even ‘originalist’ readings of
constitutions or statutes slow or even freeze law’s evolution in response to social needs.
21
This Article uses the terms “liquid” and “illiquid” as they would be employed on the trading
network of a financial market. A liquid asset can be passed at low transaction costs to another participant
in the market network, while an illiquid asset will only with difficulty find a taker. See, generally, Michael
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are well-known in all their connotations within a dominant network of law, could
speed up the appearance of development while killing its roots, much like an
overpowering fertilizer.
The globalizing push toward convergence22 and efficient unification of law
at the turn of the century focused professional attention to such an extent on the
advantages of the leading networks and their (liquidity) effects for efficient
commerce that the relational advantages of chthonic law receded into
insignificance. 23 The harmonizing push was facilitated by the ‘law and
economics’ school’s assessment of law in terms of assumed economic
efficiency. Once an economic goal was posited, it was possible normatively to
measure and project the “best” legal standards in any context —at least
theoretically.24 When comparative analysis begins with a fixed ideal in mind, it
can resemble the activity of comparing law from a natural law perspective as
Valcke explains it:
[A]ll differences between [the legal systems] must necessarily be
explainable in terms of such imperfections. Had all legal systems
been perfect renditions of the same moral law, they would be
exactly the same; their being in fact different hence was taken to
confirm that at most one of them is perfect and all others are
imperfect. Difference in other words “is perceived as an indication
that there must be something conceptually wrong.”25
Particularly when the comparative legal activity is undertaken in the context
of law and development,26 the distortion that results from treating local legal
systems as “conceptually wrong” a priori because they differ from the standard

Aitken & Carol Comerton-Forde, How should liquidity be measured?, 11 PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE
JOURNAL 45, 46 (2003). The same can be said generally of an idea or concept that enjoys or does not
enjoy currency within a network of communication. It is for this reason, that liquidity and network
externalities have been treated as synonyms in financial economic literature. See Hans R. Stoll, Future of
Securities Markets: Consolidation or Competition? 64 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL 15, 16 (2008).
22
“Convergence” has been generally understood in two ways: either the move of global legal systems
toward a mean or the evolution of legal systems toward a perfect model, best represented in US law. For
general discussions of convergence, see David Cabrelli & Mathias Siems, Convergence, Legal Origins,
and Transplants in Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative Analysis, 63 AM. J.
COMP. L. 109 (2015); Louis F. Del Duca, Developing Global Transnational Harmonization Procedures
for the Twenty-First Century: The Accelerating Pace of Common and Civil Law Convergence, 42 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 625 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641 (1999).
23
This issue is first raised by thoughtful commentators like Pistor, who began research on the broader
issues of legal standardization and the transplantation of law. See, e.g. Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra
note 14.
24
“Now it may be possible—this is the modern approach to antitrust law—to derive from a text … a
concept such as economic efficiency, and create from that concept a logical system of law, much like the
common law of torts or contracts.” Richard A. Posner, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 326, 328 (1988).
25
VALCKE, supra note 1, at 73.
26
The term “law and development” is used here with a somewhat broader meaning than that of the
Post-WWII initiative advocating appropriate design of law to stimulate socio-economic development, but
also goes to the imperative that a jurisdiction understand all criteria and consequences when choosing law
in an environment. On general use of the term, see YONG-SHIK LEE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 1.3.3. (2018).
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offered in the leading network—which is deemed superior because it achieves a
posited economic goal—presents a serious threat to contextual objectivity. A
developing country setting out to build up its law should understand the
evaluation framework that is being applied. This will help it combat distortion
arising through overvaluing network effects and the quick “liquidity” spike in
value achieved through adopting then-dominant solutions. The developing
country should recognize that a large part of the attraction found in an
international standard, or the law of a leading jurisdiction, arises not from ability
to resolve the country’s problems, but its existing value as a node in a dominant
network. 27 Moreover, as a legal system ages and expands, its attraction qua
network increases through breadth of use. Nevertheless, its quality as a system
meeting the needs of society may well be decreasing because of societal
evolution of new needs not addressed in the previously developed law. 28
Awareness of these relationships will facilitate conscious effort to resist bias
arising from network effects,29 allowing better judgment about the point on the
continuum between custom-tailored and off-the-rack law. Such awareness will
also allow a more accurate assessment of when amendment of an existing and
well-known network would be beneficial.
This Article sets out in five Parts an analysis of how legal systems are
generated within their social environment and take on a life as symbolic systems
that enjoy network effects. It places particular focus on the relevance of the
relationship between origin and systemic growth for the global development of
law. Part II will review the literature on the network property of law as a system
with network benefits for its users, explaining the advantages that arise for large
and well-known legal systems. Part III will review the theoretical work on how
a legal system arises by packaging reactively formulated solutions to social
demands into ordered concepts and evolves in dependence on its socio-political
environment. This Part will also introduce the idea of platform management
conceived on analogy from the modern platform economy, to describe the
lawmaking process. Part IV will examine the consequences of legal network
effects when legal systems compete in the development context, using as point
of reference the “legal origins” debate conducted at the turn of the century. Part
V will offer conclusions.

27
A term that can be used analogically to capture the impact of some network effects is “fashion,”
which has value even absent underlying substantive function. This is discussed in David C. Donald,
Endowment, Fundamentals and Fashion in the Market for Corporate Law, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR THEODOR
BAUMS, 309–11 (2017) (Cahn and Siekmann eds., 2017).
28
In this case, expansion of use could be driven by other factors, such as connection to a widely used
language, a strong economy, and a reserve currency. See Part IV.B.
29
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 417 (2011) (“The way to block errors that
originate in System 1 [spontaneous thinking] is simple in principle: recognize the signs that you are in a
cognitive minefield, slow down, and ask for reinforcement from System 2 [fully informed, rational
judgment].”).
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I. LEGAL SYSTEMS ARE NETWORKS OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AS NETWORK BUILDING
There is considerable evidence from the examples of Rome and Great
Britain that law’s (natural) 30 historical path leads it from an assortment of
sporadic decisions or decrees spawned by randomly occurring circumstances to
densely networked systems in which legal professionals reflect on spontaneous
solutions, build doctrine, and formulate complex statutes or codes.31 At the most
basic level, judicial decisions accumulate and become information on possible
solutions, which professionals can gather and reflect upon to derive generally
applicable rules.32 This pattern is evidenced in history. Both common law and
modern civil law took their initial shape in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,33
and then significantly accelerated their development after printed books became
available in the sixteenth century, leading into the period of codifications and
statutes. 34 Once mature, these systematic arrangements of remedies, judicial
institutions, and procedures incorporating the social expectations of a given
culture can be thought of as coterminous with the notion of “legal family” coined
by David. 35 A similar point can be made for Glenn’s concept of “legal
traditions.”36
If networks are “a collection of points joined together in pairs by lines,” in
which such points become interrelated “nodes” within the network,37 then the
network of law would have many dimensions. Interdependent structures would

30
This, of course, would not be the case for a colony into which law is imposed from abroad or a
country that adopts foreign law wholesale, as happened for some countries of continental Europe which
used transplanted Roman Law. See ALAN WATSON, EVOLUTION OF WESTERN PRIVATE LAW 193 (2001)
(“From the eleventh century to the eighteenth and even beyond, the main feature of legal change in
western continental Europe was the Reception of Roman law.”).
31
With regard to Rome, see MARÍA JOSÉ FALCÓN Y TELLA, CASE LAW IN ROMAN, ANGLOSAXON
AND CONTINENTAL LAW 7–9 (Stephen Churnin trans., 2011). Regarding Britain, see H. PATRICK GLENN,
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 254–55 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS].
This is also the developmental path assumed with respect to law’s evolution in LUHMANN, supra note 8,
at Chapter 6.
32
Glenn explains that in “1747, just 57 years before the codification of French civil law, Bourjon
published his treatise on ‘the common law of France and the custom of Paris reduced to principles.’” H.
PATRICK GLENN, ON COMMON LAWS 37 (2005) [hereinafter GLENN, COMMON LAWS].
33
See RAOUL C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 89–91 (2d ed. 1988);
and GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 31, at 140–41.
34
Bentham sums up this environment in his 1776 critique of judicial lawmaking as presented in the
Commentaries of Blackstone with an assertion that the time is a “a busy age; in which knowledge is
rapidly advancing towards perfection . . . . The most distant and recondite regions of the earth traversed
and explored . . . . analyzed and made known to striking evidences.” JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT
ON GOVERNMENT; BEING AN EXAMINATION OF WHIT IS DELIVERED, ON THE SUBJECT OF GOVERNMENT
IN GENERAL IN THE INTRODUCTION TO SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, Preface (1776).
See also RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 61–69
(3d ed. 1985).
35
“The classification of laws into families . . . can be detected by examining those fundamental
elements of the system through which the rules to be applied are themselves discovered, interpreted and
evaluated.” DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 34, at 19.
36
“[A]dherents to a tradition, or a group within a tradition, constitute a local area network of
information. The network is local because it is not—or at least not yet—universal, and it is a network
because the exchange of information is a constant and ongoing process.” GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS,
supra note 31, at 21.
37
NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 1.
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begin with common language, move upward to specifically legal meaning,38 and
then include formally related and institutional supports to the practical
significance of this meaning.39 From the point of view of the user of law, a robust
network of legal concepts could bring many benefits, including clarity, certainty,
and the ability of counterparties to understand and accept it, at low transaction
costs. Concepts taken from a well-known and highly developed legal system can
in most cases be used “off the rack” without further adjustment by users. This
advantage has been exploited well in the harmonized development of U.S. state
law by the drafting and publication of “model laws” containing widely accepted
concepts by the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (now
called the Uniform Law Commission, or ULC)40 and the American Law Institute
(ALI).41
In his analysis of network effects in corporate law, Klausner isolates five
network benefits accruing to the users of a broad and deep system of corporate
and contract law: (1) interpretive network externalities; (2) common practice
network externalities; (3) legal services network externalities; (4) marketing
network externalities; and (5) learning effects.
With a focus on the Delaware General Corporation Law and by-laws and
judicial decisions made thereon, Klausner sees the benefit of interpretive
network externalities for a corporation using open-ended clauses like that found
in a director’s duty of care, because within the dense network of Delaware
judicial decisions interpreting that duty, uncertainty would be reduced.42 This
preserves the open-ended nature of the duty necessary for giving directors
sufficient freedom of discretion, but protects directors from unpredictable
interpretations of the duty. Similarly, uncertainty would be reduced under
Delaware law with regard to the meaning of “reasonable grounds” or a
“reasonable response” when applied to a director’s action because the network
would contain definitions for these common practices fleshed out through
repeated litigation.43 The larger network would lead to more cases and more
decisions, memorializing practice in a discernable set of possibilities. Klausner
also argues that robustly networked law provides benefits in the market for legal
representation. When one selects a widely used body of law for one’s dealings,
“economies of scale and scope as well as experience-curve phenomena” would
reduce the cost and raise the efficiency of legal service providers “drafting . . .
reviewing . . . and negotiating the term,” as well as “litigating the term if a
dispute arises.”44 This would be comparable to seeking service for a well-known
and popular make of automobile, for which mechanics, know-how, and spare
parts would be readily available. When seeking investors, a company using a

38

See the discussion in GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 31, at 164.
Such support has been widely discussed, perhaps most interestingly in debate regarding the
possibility of transplanting law from one culture to another. See, e.g., Roger Cotterrell, Is There a Logic
of Legal Transplants?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 71, 79–84 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds.,
2001).
40
ACTS OVERVIEW, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/acts/overview (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020).
41
ALL PUBLICATIONS, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/publications/
#publication-type-model-codes (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
42
Networks of Contracts, supra note 3, at 777.
43
Id. at 780.
44
Id. at 782.
39
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known network of law will also receive marketing externalities because the “cost
and reliability of analyzing and pricing these terms may be affected by their
similarity to the terms that other firms use,” and if “a firm employs commonly
used terms, investors and securities analysts can use routine financial analysis to
estimate the value of its securities.”45 Likewise, use of a contract term under the
law of an established legal system means the learning process found in “past
precedents will still exist and may clarify the term’s meaning.”46
Regardless of any inherent doctrinal or conceptual quality, a body of wellestablished law will therefore enjoy network effects that reduce uncertainty and
the cost of legal services, facilitate interaction with investors and other
counterparties, and deliver the fruit of a learning process stretching back over
the period of its existence. Lined up against what most people might well expect
from good law, these network benefits are very significant, providing increased
certainty, better access to advice, and lower negotiation costs. Kahan and
Klausner examined the terms of underwriting contracts and also in this context
found “learning and network externalities, as well as switching costs . . . arise
from some contract terms.”47 Beyond any reference to substantive quality or
impact, the network properties of law make a body of law or contractual
provisions attractive in itself.
B. NETWORK EFFECTS IN LEADING LAW
Network effects increase with the size of the relevant system network, and
as Katz and Shapiro observe, “systems markets are especially prone to ‘tipping,’
which is the tendency of one system to pull away from its rivals in popularity
once it has gained an initial edge.”48 Kahn characterizes the result of such tipping
somewhat stronger from an antitrust perspective: “Since popularity compounds
and is reinforcing, markets with network effects often tip towards oligopoly or
monopoly.”49 If, as argued in the preceding Section A, legal systems display
network effects, and if a popular network tends to “pull away from its rivals”
and “tip towards oligopoly or monopoly,” it is reasonable to expect that a legal
system with early depth and size advantages over its competitors will display a
like tendency toward dominance. At a certain level of use, adoption of the
network will reach what Grewal refers to as the “threshold of inevitability,”
where “the interests of those who use a lesser standard coincide with the interests
of those who use the dominant standard,” because adoption of the dominant
standard is “preferable to social isolation.”50
Such size and depth advantages of one legal system over another can occur
when the political-economic development of two jurisdictions are unequal, and
the two then come into a close relationship with each other. Osterhammel and
Peterrson observe that this occurred (in what we would now call the “developing

45

Id. at 785.
Id. at 786.
47
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or
“The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 760 (1997).
48
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93,
105–06 (1994).
49
Lina M. Kahn, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710, 785 (2018).
50
GREWAL, supra note 11, at 121.
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world”) through the second phase of European-led globalization, beginning in
mid-eighteenth century:
[B]y the mid-eighteenth century transcontinental networks had
been established that were at least economically stable and
potentially influential. What comes next, in the period we date
from 1750 to 1880, is an expansion of worldwide integration
unprecedented in its intensity and influenced by the new
capacities in production, transportation, and communication
created by the Industrial Revolution. . . . At the same time,
European institutions, including the nation-state, and European
or “Western” thought are being exported throughout the
world.51
In this “first age of global imperialism”52 the imperial powers laid down
their law in conquered territories through forced transplantation. 53 In Hong
Kong, for example, Britain followed its military defeat of China in the First
Opium War by imposing on its new crown colony a ‘kit’ of about 20 statutes
containing all the rules necessary for a functioning port54 and establishing a
“supreme court” in which the common law of England would apply. 55 The
ultimate court of appeal for this “supreme court” was the Judicial Committee of
the U.K. Privy Council, essentially a colonial management body staffed with
seconded law lords and a special group of judges having knowledge of foreign
law once used in acquired colonies (such as that of India or the Ottoman
Empire).56 The Privy Council could adjust English law to the more inflexible
elements of foreign circumstances, thus easing the shock of domination by the
imperial law network.57 By the early twentieth century, the network of British
influence spread not only to the 25% of the world they directly controlled, but
also to Argentina and Brazil, in which they were among the largest foreign
investors, so “that it seems quite legitimate to speak of ‘informal imperialism’

51
JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL AND & NIELS P. PETERSSON, GLOBALIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY 28
(Dona Geyer trans., 2005).
52
JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 59 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2014).
53
This did not happen equally in all colonies. Colonies serving for mineral or other resource
extraction had far less use for law and other supporting institutions than did settled or trade center colonies.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1370 (2001).
54
These included, for example, ordinances on registration of deeds and wills, merchant shipping,
usury laws, distillation of spirits, licensing public houses, harbor regulation, salt, opium licensing, weights
and measures, and good order and cleanliness. See DAVID C. DONALD, A FINANCIAL CENTRE FOR TWO
EMPIRES: HONG KONG’S CORPORATE, SECURITIES AND TAX LAWS IN ITS TRANSITION FROM BRITAIN TO
CHINA 23–32 (2014).
55
An Ordinance to Establish a Supreme Court of Judicature at Hong Kong, Ordinance No. 15 of 1844,
§§2–3 (“there shall be within and for the Colony of Hongkong a Court, which shall be called ‘The
Supreme Court of Hongkong’, and . . . . the law of England shall be in full force in the said Colony.”).
56
Ivor Richardson, The Privy Council as the Final Court for the British Empire, 43 VICTORIA U. OF
WELLINGTON L. REV. 103 (2012).
57
Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry, The Empire’s Sentinels: The Privy Council’s Quest to Balance Idealism
and Pragmatism, 1 BIRKBECK L. REV. 15, 22 (2013).
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in these countries.”58 Approximating the commercially relevant law used in its
various colonies to that of Britain obviously had enormous network utility.
Operating the supply chain for opium under virtually identical law from India to
Singapore and on to Hong Kong could greatly reduce transaction costs and legal
risk. However, even the poor historical records available show cases of real
damage done to local populations, such as loss livelihood and land rights by
local Chinese in Hong Kong,59 as the colony built up its legal system primarily
for purposes of transshipping opium and other inter-colonial merchandise.
Part IV examines how the dominant global network established by
Europeans through colonization largely passed to the U.S. in the late twentieth
century. With hindsight, the beginning of this process can be perceived early in
that century at about the time the U.S. economy became the world’s largest.60
Systems of industrial mass production and the generation of mass culture like
cinema were first developed in the U.S., giving it first-starter advantage in its
interaction with the existing, less-developed organizational forms found in other
countries.61 The U.S. lead in globalization, which began in this way, lurched
dramatically forward in both 1945 and 1989, with victories in both World War
II and the Cold War.62 Use of the English language, which the U.K. had already
spread throughout its colonies and major trade routes, facilitated insertion into
the American global network.63 As Immerwahr puts it, the British left behind a
“world almost designed for the convenience of the United States.” 64 U.S.
institutional ideas were translated into the major global organizations created in
the wake of World War II.65 As the only major manufacturers left standing in
1945, U.S. corporations became the first collection of post-colonial
multinational firms, carrying their standards,66 law, and lawyers with them.67

58
NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER AND THE
LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER 203 (Basic Books 2004).
59
CHRISTOPHER MUNN, ANGLO-CHINA: CHINESE PEOPLE AND BRITISH RULE IN HONG KONG, 1841–
80, 1889–98 (2003). Such subtle damage of course pales by comparison to the ordinary colonial
dispossession and enslavement of indigenous peoples in various European colonial holdings from the
fifteenth century, but nevertheless would allow interesting comparison to the slanting of laws still found
in places like Hong Kong and Singapore, which benefit international transactions and the exit and entry
of capital while creating a difficult and expensive environment for ordinary residents.
60
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND
SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 5 (1982).
61
OSTERHAMMEL & PETERSSON, supra note 51, at 108–09.
62
ALFRED W. MCCOY, IN THE SHADOWS OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
US GLOBAL POWER Kindle Location 1063 (2017) (“[Decolonialization] became the foundation for an
expanding American presence . . . . Despite its rapid retreat, the British Empire left behind both models
and methods that would influence this emerging hegemony.”).
63
Id.
64
DANIEL IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE GREATER UNITED STATES
597 (2019).
65
The work of Henry Morgenthau and Harry White in the U.S. Treasury to devise the key Bretton
Woods institutions is described in some detail by Benn Steil. BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON
WOODS: JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HARRY DEXTER WHITE, AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD ORDER
125–28 (2013). See also TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 107–08 (2005); and
OSTERHAMMEL & PETERSSON, supra note 51, at 121–26.
66
In 1945, the Anglophone powers created the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
which worked to make U.S. industrial standards the world standards. IMMERWAHR, supra note 64, at
Kindle Location 5228–40.
67
It should also be remembered that the converging impetus of these multinational enterprises was
accompanied by a well-known tendency to engage in regulatory arbitrage between diverging national
laws, triggering fears of a “race to the bottom” as states competed for their presence. Peter Muchlinski,
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II. LEGAL SYSTEMS ARISE FROM THEIR SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
A. SYSTEMS THEORY ON THE SOCIAL CONTENT OF LAW
“A legal institution, to be at all meaningful, depends on a societal
institution.” 68 Nevertheless, Watson can also advocate transplantation of law
between very different social environments because law can serve as “a kind of
shorthand” for the solution a society has reached.69 Luhmann focuses much of
his work on this (autopoietic) aspect of law as a system that depends first on
society for its content and purpose, yet secondly operates independent from
society, with its own rigorous logic and rules.70 In the present Article it is argued
that law’s network strengths observed by Klausner and others should be
understood as a property of the “second-order” functions defined by Luhmann.
They are legal-system-inherent rather than socially interactive, for they regard
the sematic value of specifically legal concepts and specifically legal support
systems. This Part explores the tension between the two systemic facets found
in law—the creation of responses to social expectations and the systematic
integrity of self-affirming rules and procedures that can be transferred and
transplanted to different societies. The discussion begins with an obvious point
of departure: Luhmann’s sociologically oriented systems theory. It then also
examines more traditional theories of law, where a structurally similar, socially
dependent view can also be found – albeit expressed with different terminology.
Lastly, this Part will examine the platform of legal institutions that takes in social
values as input to generate doctrinally coherent law and issue remedies as its
output.
Luhmann’s systems theory explores in minute detail the interaction between
expectations based on social norms and the creation of legal rules. Like common
law scholars, Luhmann sees disputes as a driving force in the development of
law, and the strength of his theory is in showing the active dynamics of a legal
system that is both dependent on and (autopoietic) independent from society.
“Expectations” regarding rights and duties arise within the social system, as
Luhmann explains: “The term ‘norm’ refers to a certain form of factual
expectation, which has to be observable either psychologically or as the intended
and understandable meaning of communication.”71 The interaction between the
legal system and the environment of the social system is communicative, as legal
institutions are constantly receiving requests to resolve disputes about right and
wrong according to social expectations.72 When differing expectations lead to
conflict, they “irritate” the legal system by challenging it to settle the matter:
“The system itself registers the irritation—for instance, in the form of the

Multinational Enterprises, in 1 OXFORD PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 40–43 (2nd ed., 2007). The
phenomenon shows a certain schizophrenia, with firms seeking uniformity in areas like contract law and
perhaps financing techniques, but working to preserve heterogeneity in areas like tax, environmental,
labor and safety standards.
68
Id.; WATSON, supra note 30, at 196.
69
Id.
70
LUHMANN, supra note 8, at 73–75.
71
Id. at 71.
72
Id. at 142–143.
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problem of who is right if there is a conflict.”73 If the legal system does not
already contain a solution for the conflict between expectations, it may be forced
to evolve:
The decisive variation, as far as the evolution of law is
concerned, relates to the communication of unexpected
normative expectations . . . . which—with hindsight—turns out
to be a disappointment. This disappointment brings to mind the
norm, which did not exist as a structure for communication in
society before this occurred . . . . Such events happen as soon as
there are normative expectations . . . . It is sufficient for one to
see a reason to reject certain conduct and to be successful in
having this rejection accepted by others.74
For Luhmann, this act of creating a new structure, essentially a legal concept,
will mean that the legal system’s reaction to this expectation is evolution. That
is, when faced with the variation made by the new expectation, the legal system
adapts to address the new normative expectation, the legal system will use its
own conceptual framework to stabilize the law in a new form.75
The legal system relies completely on stimulus from society for this
evolution, “so that the law of modern society must make do without a certain
future . . . [T]here is no general faith in ‘salvation’, ‘progress’, or ‘apocalypse’”76
or any other conceptually determined telos (such as the “end of history” with
law reaching the ideal of maximum economic efficiency). Luhmann’s theory
embraces the Darwinian concept of evolution77 because he finds that it allows
system boundaries to be conceived as porous and change to be understood as
unplanned, rather than evidencing unified teleology. 78 This evolutionary
interaction is conceived in the same way as physical evolution, with the
significant qualification that the interaction between social environment and
operatively closed legal system occurs through medium of language. The
“autopoiesis”79 of the legal system “shifts the idea of self-referential make-up to
the level of the elementary operations”80 (i.e., to individual concepts formed in
judicial or legislative decisions and away from any type of overall telos).
Unplanned prompting from the social environment in a developing country
would be exactly the kind of “irritant” that would allow the legal system to
develop as that society’s law, but such stimulus would not feed development if
the effectiveness of a legal system were to be judged by similarity to a leading
network of law with high global recognition and use.
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Id. at 383.
Id. at 243–244.
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Id. at 258–59.
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Id. at 470–71 (italics in original).
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LUHMANN, supra note 8, at 230–31. (“We shall use the concept of evolution in accordance with
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Id. at 231.
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The self-referential autopoiesis reacts to information received (social
expectations) with legal concepts through the systematic processing that occurs
between the operationally closed legal system and its social environment.81 The
autopoietic activity is capable of adjusting both the contents of the legal system
and the procedure the legal system uses to determine such contents: “Autopoietic
systems … not only … produce and eventually change their own structures but
their self-reference applies to the production of other components as well.”82
This “requires a synthesis of three selections: namely, information, utterance and
understanding,” and the synthesis is produced “by the network of
communication, not by some kind of inherent power of consciousness, or by the
inherent quality of the information.” 83 Indeed, the information processed is
already part of the system processing it: “[p]ieces of information don’t exist ‘out
there’, waiting to be picked up by the system. As selections, they are produced
by the system itself.”84 This resembles what we see in Section B, below, with
respect to theory of common law: the ‘writs’ or ‘causes of action’ built into the
procedural system of the law only allow certain information to matter, to have
significance for the legal system.
At the points where “irritating” interaction occurs between the legal system
and society (or its other subsystems), the legal system develops interfaces that
respond to expectations presented to the legal system. Luhmann calls these
interfaces “structural couplings.” 85 They are concepts and formal institutions
that straddle the line between the legal system and the social environment.
“Property,” “contract,” and “capacity” are important structural couplings that
allow the legal system to arbitrate over the society’s conflicts on right or wrong,
win or lose, legal or illegal in important and problematic interactions with
significant economic and social importance.86 The concept of property allows a
thing of value contested in the social sphere to be an object of specified rights
and duties, and the concept of contract permits a relationship among persons
bristling with potential dispute to become a bundle of obligations which are
created, performed and dissolved in specified ways. Luhmann shows how these
couplings evolve with society, so that the contents of the concepts “property”
and “contract” were able to be systemically adjusted from the medieval to the
modern periods as private autonomy and commercial flexibility became more
central in the social and economic systems.87 “The coupling turns operations of
the economic system into irritations of the legal system and operations of the
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The legal system also acts by choosing not to react to a given stimulus. Id. at 293. As discussed in
Section III.B, the filter on what the legal system will recognize as a complaint and what it will refuse—
that is the shape and extension of the writs—is the key to the early common law.
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legal system into irritations of the economic system.88 The manner in which
these structurally coupling “applications” function in the legal system will be
determined by the architecture of the legal system, but the content of each of the
legal platform’s concepts will be under continued “irritation” by any changes in
the expectations of the social and economic environment.
Luhmann’s systems theory thus presents an operationally closed legal
system with porous openings to its environment in the shape of these “structural
couplings.” The content of law is adjusted by the legal system’s choice of
reaction to “irritations” that social expectations present in the form of demands
for a declaration of right or wrong, win or lose, legal or illegal. Society and the
legal system can communicate, but the professionally crafted technical
coherence (Luhmann calls it “programing”)89 of law controls the ultimate form
of the concept it will select in its evolutionary adjustment. In this theory,
expectations shape the creation of rules through pressure at the system periphery
(legislature) or formal requests at the system’s core (courts) in connection with
disputes.90
This activity of law is “a general form of system-building using selfreferential closure” 91 that is also necessarily open to its environment. The legal
system processes material from its environment into and through itself in a way
that also supports that same environment. The legal system embedded within
society spins out its own network of concepts, institutions and procedures
through which to meet the expectations of society. This legal system reacts to
social pressure, but the product of its reaction takes on the objective reality of a
systematically coherent network. As will be explained in Section C, this
synthesizing activity of the legal and social systems resembles a “platform” used
in businesses like iTunes, Uber, or Airbnb because the information coming into
the legal system is necessary but not sufficient to make law, and must be filtered
and reconstructed according to the internal logic of the legal platform before it
can be consumed by the society as law. On the other hand, the platform has no
purpose of its own other than to react to and process the available information
found in the environment in order to meet the needs and expectations of its users.

88
Id. at 392. For example, the concept of property requires activity of the legal system to protect
ownership and transfer of objects considered to be property, and the decisions of the legal system will
shape possible forms of ownership and transfer in the economic system—each system “irritating” the
other.
89
Id. at 118; “We will call the rules for allocation (with whatever margin for interpretation)
programmes . . . . The operative closure of the legal system is secured by coding [of legal/illegal]. But at
the level of programming it can be determined on which grounds and in which respects the system has to
process cognitions.” Id. at 118.
90
“Only courts have to transform indeterminacy into determinacy where necessary, only courts have
to construct fictitiously the availability or unavailability of principles, where necessary . . . . Consequently,
the organization of the courts as a sub-system is at the centre of the legal system . . . . All other areas of
law belong to the periphery. This applies … to legislation . . . . legislation proliferates, yielding to political
pressure and seeping into previously unregulated areas . . . . It is in the periphery that irritations are
translated into legal form—or not.” Id. at 292–293.
91
Luhmann, supra note 82, at 172.
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B. COMMON LAW IS LOCAL, NEITHER TRANSPLANTED NOR OFF-THE-RACK
The review of Luhmann’s systems theory presented above shows that the
robust operation of a legal system generated in response to the needs of a given
social environment would be disrupted if law were to be mainly self-contained,
a constellation of concepts and solutions existing as a network of abstract
values.92 Such a view of law as a network with transcendental, internal grammar
would indeed mean that it could easily be transplanted “shorthand” from one
environment to a completely different one. However, law is much more than a
network of symbolic logic, and this point does not require a reader to accept
Luhmann’s socially-oriented systems theory
As this Section will show, law’s genesis in “social irritations” is central to
the formulations of legal theorists having no connection with systems theory,
and even when these legal theorists do not consider their work to be in any way
“sociological” in character. For example, in 1881, Holmes characterized law as
a two-part cultural aggregation in which societal contents are processed by an
enduring professional platform: “The substance of the law at any given time
pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be
convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to
work out desired results, depends very much upon its past.”93 The following
paragraphs will examine in some detail conceptions of law presented by H.
Patrick Glenn’s comparative law theory of legal traditions, Melvin Eisenberg’s
theory of the common law, and Sir John Baker’s history of English law.
As one would expect, when compared to Luhmann, legal scholars bring a
more detailed analysis of the various practical components of the legal system,
including law’s origins, evolution, function and inter-dependence with society.
They also articulate a deep understanding of the thought processes and training
of persons—like judges or legal counsel—who shape the law through their
professional activity.
Baker is a legal historian concerned with evaluating trustworthy historical
sources of information on legal development, as well as a barrister, and finds
that law exists largely in the minds of legal professionals: “The law today is not
what particular courts or parliaments in the past have said it is, but what lawyers
at present think the relevant courts would do in a given case.”94 Baker finds in
early English common law that writs, claims and court procedures channel the
general norms and usages of the community for the court.95 Supplementing this,
however, legal professionals act as a living archive of social expectations on
what justice means: “[T]he law may be perceived as being what the courts ought

92
If this were the case, Saussure’s study of language as an arbitrary, yet internally coherent system
of signs would also be a fitting analysis of law. See Saussure, supra note 10, at 25–26 (“The language
itself is a system which admits no other order than its own. This can be brought out by comparison with
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internal.”).
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4 (2001).
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to do, in the opinion of the best legal minds of the day, even if those are not the
minds currently controlling the decisions of the highest appellate court.”96 The
social content of law—particularly including the sub-system of the law’s
caretakers—is as important as the logical and doctrinal content of texts. Baker
explains that as used in English law, the maxim “communis error facit jus”
(common error makes law) has meant that usage will take precedence over
doctrine, and thus innovative usages technically violating the law have
eventually become law themselves. 97 Social action eventually becomes the
content issued by the platform of the legal system:
People sometimes manage their affairs on the basis that they do
not mind whether the law protects them or not. Sometimes they
may explicitly avoid the forms and the protection of the law . . .
Far more often, people will follow practices or enter into
arrangements with complete disregard of their legal
consequences. They rely on other kinds of security, such as trust
and reputation, or the fact that everyone else does the same, and
simply do not contemplate the possibility of litigation. Such
practices may in time become so widespread that to deny legal
protection begins to seem perverse. The trust of land is an
obvious example.98
Baker goes on to provide an example from Lord Coke in which “common
assurances” are given force of law in the conveyancing of property.99 Baker’s
particular contribution to our understanding of law is that even as a highly versed
barrister, lecturer, and historian with an intimate knowledge of statutory and case
law, he still looks to societal sources of order outside of written law for the origin
of law’s content. It is difficult to imagine how this content could be captured in
a network of concepts that can be transferred “shorthand” to far-flung
jurisdictions.
Eisenberg steps away from his work in corporate and contract law to
investigate the nature of the common law in a work primarily examining the
creation and evolution of various legal doctrines and principles during the
twentieth century.100 Like Baker, Eisenberg sees the common law as originating
within a social and professional environment, taking shape even before a court
discerns it and memorializes it in a decision: “The common law does not consist
of doctrinal propositions found in binding official texts. Rather, it consists of the
rules that would be generated at the present moment by application of the
institutional principles that govern common law adjudication.” 101 While this
may appear to be the manifestation of a Platonic ideal, it is rather the systemic
creation of a solution along the lines described by Luhmann, and the
“institutional principles of adjudication” are for Eisenberg divided—to use

96

BAKER, supra note 94, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 25.
99
Id. at 73.
100
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
101
Id. at 3 (emphasis added); see also id. at 154.
97
98

284

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 10:2

Holmes’ terminology—between what is deemed “convenient” and how the
“machinery” should operate. For Eisenberg, just and legitimate law consists of
achieving a “consistent” and “congruent” balance of key elements taken from
the legal system and other aspects of the social environment (social beliefs,
science respected at the time, and accepted routines).102 In the framework for
law developed by Eisenberg, “justice” finds a close analogue in “congruence”
of the law and the expectations formulated in society with regard to the problem
in question.
Eisenberg refers to the manner in which social expectations shape law’s
content as an inclusion of “social propositions.” This term includes the
categories of “moral norms” (characterizing conduct as right or wrong), 103
“policies” (characterizing choices as “conducive or adverse to the general
welfare”), 104 and “experiential propositions” (social or hard science
understandings about “the way the world works”).105 In systems theory terms,
these arise out of different social sub-systems. Moral norms are for Eisenberg,
“moral standards that claim to be rooted in aspirations for the community as a
whole, and that . . . can fairly be said to have substantial support in the
community.”106 Eisenberg demonstrates how moral norms enter law to adjust
rules for liability in landmark products liability cases (shifting protection from
manufacturers to consumers) and malpractice allegations for a failed vasectomy
(previous understanding of pregnancy as indisputable blessing changes to a
parental choice). 107 Eisenberg’s most serious challenge when modeling the
incorporation of moral norms into written law is understanding when such norms
are truly “rooted in aspirations for the community” and how courts can discern
this. His explanation that courts can look to existing cases and legislation, news
media, and their own common knowledge,108 remains ultimately unsatisfying.
This is a practical problem Luhmann avoids within his much more generalized
theory of constant communication and autopoiesis. With Luhmann, we
understand that there will be a “structure for communication” in response to a
social expectation, but beyond the shape of a specific judicial complaint we do
not see how the expectation of right and wrong materializes.
Eisenberg also asserts that “policy” will shape the materialization of
common law, and those he identifies show how law can be changed in relation
to changes in social positions. Policies he examines determine whether a court
should hear an action and who should bear burdens within the proceeding. The
policies are “social gravity,” “private autonomy,” “opportunism,” and
“information asymmetry,” which he argues were applied by a court refraining
from the exercise of its power over a matter not considered socially important
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The cases Eisenberg analyzes are MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916) and
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] LR App. Cas. 562 with regard to a liability of negligent manufacture
even absent privity of contact; and Christensen v. Thornby, 225 N.W. 620 (1977), regarding the value of
childbirth in connection with a breach of contract for sterilization. Eisenberg also examines the evolution
in contract law away from strict consideration toward promissory estoppel in Central London Property
Trust v. High Trees House, [1947] KB 130.
108
EISENBERG, supra note 100, at 16–17.
103

2020

LEGAL SYSTEM NETWORK EFFECTS AND GLOBAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENT

285

(e.g., donative promises) or one considered within private autonomy (e.g.,
bargains on allocations of tasks in a marriage), a court refusing to enforce an
agreement if that would encourage opportunism (e.g., a fee for premium police
protection), and a court applying a presumption of guilt to force someone in
control of necessary information to divulge it (e.g., strict product liability).109
Eisenberg does not examine the extent to which the analytical framework a court
might use in applying a policy might itself constitute evidence of a social choice.
The societal sub-system of the sciences creates the last group of propositions
Eisenberg sees influencing courts when they make decisions, and he refers to it
as “experiential propositions.” 110 Eisenberg explains that these propositions
“mediate between policies (and to a lesser extent moral norms) . . . and legal
rules.” Examples he provides are theories about behavior from psychology and
sociology on expected response to incentives and deterrence, and the assumed
usages governing behavior in particular industries or commercial activities.111
Such propositions are taken directly from the social and hard sciences the society
currently respects in order to provide assumptions about behavior and causality
in cases tried. Such assumptions about human behavior are of course derived by
conscious method in a field like psychology, but some have been known to exist
as long as organized society, as evidenced by the behavioral assumptions
presented in narratives like Aesop’s Fables.
As the common law is composed largely of moral norms and experiential
propositions known to the litigants when the actions leading to dispute occur,
the problem of retroactive effectiveness of judicially crafted law is significantly
reduced.112 Today’s application of previously unwritten common law to an event
that happened last year presents no problem of retroactivity because the social
propositions that constitute common law enjoyed community support and were
thus known to the litigants in the jurisdiction at the time the dispute arose. This
is further evidence of the social origin of law. The professional packaging of
these social propositions into a judicial decision should, according to Eisenberg,
achieve a congruent balance that is objectively universal (in the Kantian sense
of the first categorical imperative),113 obviously reproducible (e.g., by all legal
counsel in a jurisdiction advising clients), and responsive to critical comment
from the community (particularly legal community). 114 Eisenberg presents a
model that generally corresponds to the two, interdependent systems seen in
Luhmann’s systems theory: the legal system receives its information on the
content of law from the social system and then packages that information for
generality, consistency, and coherence.
In his major study of world law, Glenn also grounds his theory of law in the
history of decisive social conventions, expectations, and usages that shape law.
His Legal Traditions of the World finds that legal traditions have generally been
understood as emerging from a hub of data engaged in self-processing:
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“[T]he concept of universality . . . requires the courts to resolve disputes by establishing and
applying rules that are applicable not merely to the parties to the immediate dispute but to all those who
are similarly situated.” Id. at 9.
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A given tradition emerges as a loose conglomeration of data,
organized around a basic theme or themes, and variously
described as a ‘bundle’, a ‘tool-box’, a ‘language’, a
‘playground’, a ‘seedbed’, a ‘ragbag’ or a ‘bran-tub’. In the
language of modern information theory, a tradition will always
include a great deal of noise …. The fate of present information,
and its effect on the future course of a tradition, will depend on
the working and processes of the tradition itself.115
A Western attempt to escape dependence on this bundle of data enduring
from the past was the turn to rationality, to enlightened reason, but Glenn finds
“context is the unavoidable companion of all efforts toward free-standing
rationality,”116 so that tradition and rationality remain co-dependent. Roughly as
found in Luhmann’s view of systems, Glenn depicts a two-part model of legal
development with roots in a noisy bundle of traditional values and rationality
working to hone this tradition into a coherent legal framework: “The information
in a tradition . . . is preserved because of its utility . . . [it] is important . . . [yet]
the totality of information in the tradition . . . is constantly undergoing a process
of review, appreciation and ongoing communication.” 117 Glenn sees this
intersection of inheritance and alteration as the creation of a network: “adherents
to a tradition … constitute a local area network [LAN] of information . . . and it
is a network because the exchange of information is a constant and ongoing
process.”118
Following this theoretical line, Glenn understands the English common law,
in full agreement with other historical and comparative accounts, as “composed
of a series of procedural routes (usually referred to as remedies) to get before a
jury and state one’s case.”119 Glenn also finds that the political economy of the
social setting in which the common law arose determined both this structure and
the remedies it provided. As Glenn remarks, available remedies in the form of
“writs . . . reflected, above all, an agrarian, non-commercial, even chthonic
society.” 120 The system architecture took shape as Norman kings needed to
achieve firm control of England without provoking unmanageable reactions.
They therefore focused on the procedural (rather than substantive) nature of law,
which left ultimate decisions to the jury, serving to “co-opt the population into
their work, so if actual decisions were left to the local folks . . . the judges could
just get the right questions asked . . . and be off to another town.”121 This also
left the provision of law to follow demand for a rule by directly interested
parties,122 a ‘bottom up’ characteristic which would later endear common law to
commentators judging law with economic principles.
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As the legal system matured, it went the way of other legal systems, placing
more power in the system architects who “appropriated” the authority of social
expectations, so that law from institutions of positive power was achieved.123
Existing cases were increasingly restated into general studies allowing principles
to be discerned, national territories of law were more clearly defined, and the
idea of the legal system as positive source of law was reinforced in
scholarship.124
From the above discussion of work by Baker, Eisenberg, and Glenn, it is
evident that the essential link between the legal system and its social
environment is professed not only by sociological systems theorists, but can be
found in a broad range of legal scholarship. It should be noted, however, that a
similar view is rarely found in economic analysis of law. Economists—even
institutional economists—treat law primarily as something clearly decided and
written down, even when analyzing case law. While a classic ‘law and
economics’ analysis will likely contain much open speculation about the
expected behavior of a rational actor, little or no time will be spent on how social
expectations shape formulations of justice that become written into the text of
law.125 What is more, even when looking beyond legal texts to informal social
constraints on behavior, economic analysis tends to view the restraints as
essentially static. 126 When examining common law, North sees a text-based
interaction between existing written precedent and newly arising cases:
Common law is precedent based . . . Past decisions become
embedded in the structure of law, which changes marginally as
new cases arise involving new, or at least in terms of past cases
unforeseen, issues; when decided these become, in turn, a part
of the legal framework. The judicial decisions reflect the
subjective processing of information in the context of the
historical construction of the legal framework.127
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GLENN, COMMON LAWS supra note 32, at 44–45.
Id. at 46–47.
For example, a prominent article on the efficiency of common law portrays the decisions of
litigants and judges as “forces pressing toward efficiency” in a textual field of case law and statutes which
survive or are eliminated depending upon their relationship to the efficient flow of those “forces”. While
the social interaction between individuals and institutions are not ignored, they are subsumed under the
larger ideal of an efficient market for justice: “This paper has argued that individual judges may be
irrational, just as individual consumers may be irrational, yet the rules in force, like reactions in the market,
may in sum exhibit strong rational characteristics. Economic variables, not psychological attributes of
judges, will lead to regularities in the cases that come before judges.” George L. Priest, The Common Law
Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 65, 77 (1977).
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Ostrom defines “institutions” as “the sets of working rules that are used to determine who is
eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules
will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and
what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions.” ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS) 50–51 (1990). This neglects consideration of the culture of legal
professionals on which Baker—a practicing barrister—can place so much weight.
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DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS) 96–97 (James Alt & Douglass North eds.,
1990). In the quoted passage, the words “issues” and “processing of information” would allow North a
window to analyze how social expectations enter into the lawmaking process and shape law, but he does
not pursue these topics. Id. at 96–97.
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This is generally the level of law visible to those not active in the legal
profession, so that the interaction of written texts as the sum of law operates at
the level of network pointed out by Klausner and discussed in Part II. This
somewhat static aspect appears even in North’s view of “informal constraints,”
which are defined as “codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions,”128
that coexist with and supplement written law but are not understood to
dynamically shape it. Using such an analysis, law can be considered as a
structured field of concepts with an inherent logic that endures – like Saussure’s
chess game – regardless of the environment into which it is transplanted. This
changes, however, if the legal network is seen as shaped by expectations
circulating within the social environment and drawing shape from such
expectations.
C. LEGAL SYSTEM INSTITUTIONS AS PLATFORMS TO ACHIEVE COMBINATORIAL
INNOVATION
Part II and the preceding sections of this Part III have shown it is possible
to model legal systems as a generative social process and a generated system of
concepts and institutions. This model sees the legal system nested within the
society, receiving information and requests from it, and then autopietically (i.e.,
according to its own internal logic) designing solutions. As a product of this
process, law is a network of concepts and remedies whose direct contact with
social origin is mediated through the logical efforts of the legal profession and
the doctrine it creates. These two facets can be conceived in many ways—sides,
faces, phases, or aspects—but one remains spontaneous (societal irritation is
beyond the legal system’s control) while the other is the result of a body of
professionally arranged rules, remedies, and procedures. As Luhmann puts it,
“[o]nly through complex legal dogmatics can the stabilization and restabilization
of law be shifted from the simple … validity of assigned norms to their
consistency.” 129 As stable product, law takes on all the traditional network
externalities found in a language or other system of standards, and these network
benefits increase with scale of adoption and usage. Many analogies have been
formulated to describe the manner in which law incorporates social norms.
Glenn mentions a number of common implements like “tool-box” and “bran-tub”
being used in different cultures, as well as local area “network (LAN)”; 130
Luhmann makes reference to “programming”, 131 and law and economics
scholars often refer to “the market”.132 This Article illustrates the transition from
social elements to useful network with a stylized characterization of the legal
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Id. at 36. This view, which one could achieve by looking at the volumes of a case reporter building
up over the years, contrasts well with Luhmann’s more dynamic and informed view of the judicial activity
(which resembles Eisenberg’s analysis): “[T]he decision is not determined by the past (including, of
course, laws which were passed, acts which were committed). The decision operates within its own
construction, which is only possible in the present. It opens up or closes down possibilities, which would
not exist without it.” LUHMANN, supra note 8, at 283.
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LUHMANN, supra note 8, at 257.
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GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 31, at 15–16.
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LUHMANN, supra note 8, at 118.
132
See, e.g., Priest, supra note 125, at 77.
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system’s institutions as a “platform” that receives unstructured content from its
environment and packages it for users in that same environment.
In the 2000s, businesses organized as platforms became a dominant market
force through the general availability of data, processing power, and
transmission via the Internet. Examples of platforms in this sense are Amazon,
iTunes, Google Play, Airbnb and Uber.133 Van Alstyne, Parker and Choudary
define “platform” as a system that “provides the infrastructure and rules for a
marketplace that brings together producers and consumers,” where “producers”
are the “creators of the platform’s offerings (for example, apps on Android)” and
“consumers” are the “buyers or users of the offerings.” 134 The value of a
platform is its provision of an architecture “facilitating interactions between
external producers and consumers,” so that “ecosystem governance becomes an
essential skill” of the platform provider.135 Effective platform governance seeks
to maximize “the total value of an expanding ecosystem in a circular, iterative,
feedback-driven process.”136 The keys to a platform’s success are:
[D]emand-side economies of scale, also known as network
effects …. [T]he larger the network, the better the matches
between supply and demand and the richer the data that can be
used to find matches. Greater scale generates more value, which
attracts more participants, which creates more value—another
virtuous feedback loop.137
Platforms thus manage networks that package and distribute information or
services within a community of users and such information or services take
shape as a network.
It is common to grasp organized securities exchanges as platform-managed
networks. Stock exchanges offer both a controlled trading environment (times
and places where trading occurs) and rules (applicable to both traders and issuers)
to govern trading. The platform vets and bonds traders while also essentially repackaging obscure and risk laden negotiable instruments into “listed securities”
whose value is protected from asymmetric information and fraud by an entire
architecture of supervision and transparency.138 The network effect generated by
this platform architecture is most often referred to as “liquidity.”139 As Fisman
and Sullivan argue, this design is not new and can be seen at least as early as the

133
Amazon networks producers and consumers to create a virtual retail environment; iTunes
(formerly) and Google Play network the producers of music, games, and general applications to bring
various types of entertainment and services to personal computing devices; Airbnb networks the owners
(or lessees) of real estate and those seeking use short-term use; and Uber networks those with automobiles
with those seeking one-off transportation. See, e.g., Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the
Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 61, 61–69 (2016).
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Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Geoffrey G. Parker and & Sangeet Paul Choudary, Pipelines, Platforms,
and the New Rules of Strategy, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2016, at 54, 58.
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Id. at 57.
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See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ & RETO FRANCIONI, EQUITY MARKETS IN ACTION 292–312 (2004).
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See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Champagne fairs of medieval France, 140 where the rules of a princedom
protected property interests in merchandise, sales receipts, and contractual
commitments to stimulate use of the market fair by lowering risk of loss and
thus transaction costs.141
Yet platforms are more than abstract markets. They perform what McAfee
and Brynjolfsson call “combinatorial innovation,” which means “putting
together in new ways things that were already there (perhaps with a few
generally novel ingredients).”142 The spare room in your home becomes part of
a virtual hotel through the distribution network of Airbnb, just as the family car
becomes a temporary taxi through Uber or Lyft. Combinatorial innovation is the
key aspect of platforms that should be highlighted when the arrangement is
applied analogically to model a legal system. The values expressed in law are
derived from and correspond to those expressed in the surrounding society.143
As a platform composed of courts, legislatures, law schools, and law firms, the
legal system re-packages sometimes nebulous socio-cultural expectations and
values into sufficiently sharp concepts of law.144 Milhaupt and Pistor call courts
“the ultimate demand-driven law producers,” 145 as judicial decisions are
prompted purely by social demand for remedy. Even in the positivist legal
tradition and with reference to legislative action, combinatorial innovation of
social content exists, for Hart argues that, “[t]he law of every modern state shows
at a thousand points the influence of both the accepted social morality and the
wider moral ideals” entering “either abruptly and avowedly through legislation,
or silently and piecemeal through the judicial process.”146
Institutions of the legal system platform weave raw social information into
well-ordered law. Courts, their procedures and their institutions, such as judge,
jury, and rules of procedure, are designed to process information, which is why
a trial court is referred to as a finder or trier of fact.147 Courts hear facts and law
as argued by the parties, and have little if any duty or right to explore information
not brought to them by the parties in dispute.148 Information is pushed into the
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proceedings through the written pleadings, oral arguments, and evidence
presented at trial, and information is also pulled into the proceedings through
concepts designed to fine tune law to social expectations (e.g., the “reasonable
person”149) and inevitably to a certain extent through the personal experience
that the judge150 and (when used) the jury151 bring to their deliberations. While
statutory law could, in theory, be written by an executive or a single member of
legislature isolated from society and relying on his or her private understanding
of justice, such instances are rare in modern history. Statutes are more likely
assembled by large teams of legislators and their assistants, drawing on
information presented by an even larger body of technical staff. 152 The
lawmaking activity of legislatures may well be arranged institutionally in
committees to receive data from a broad variety of sources, to process that data
using varied and powerful tools, and to hammer out draft legislation under the
eyes and the comments of many people who can provide a check on power.153
Unlike courts, legislatures need not use procedural rituals to filter the
presentation of information to the legislative decision-making process. The goal
of a legislature is to produce workable rules that are “commensurate with the
actual and ideal orders that circumscribe its field of action,” and these orders
arise from “the aspirations and tolerances of the people whose lives” will be
regulated by the legislation.154 “Restatements” of the law process case law into
rules general enough for legislation, making an efficient bridge between case
law and statute.155 This modern information processing system is not completely
unlike that used in reducing opinions of Roman praetor and jurists to the Digest

presented by counsel is an important distinction between systems originating in the English common law
and those originating in the Continental European civil law systems, which are sometimes referred to as
“inquisitorial.” See, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
§18V (Tony Weir trans., 1998); RAOUL C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE
FUTURE 52–53 (2002).
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“Jurors can safely be presumed to be familiar with prevailing community values. Beyond that, in
consulting community values, the jury would in an important sense be applying the ‘law’ because the
common law has designated those values as part of the reasonable person standard.” Stephen G. Gilles,
On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury,
54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 833–834 (2001).
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LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15–17 (2007). Eisenberg introduces the large body of scholarship on fiduciary duties
of appointed officers (developed with regard to corporate directors) into the debate, arguing that judges
should be understood not primarily as human beings but rather as that aspect of a human being that is a
professional persona whose purpose is to fulfil a specific role. EISENBERG, supra note 100, at 23–24.
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The jury’s verdict will be structured through instructions put to it by the judge, which further
channels how the information will be processed. See MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L MIRSKY, JURY
TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY 139–52 (2005).
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and Code of Justinian. 156 An unpredictable input of social demands and
expectations is filtered, packaged, and offered to the public as a well-ordered
network of rights, duties, procedures, and remedies. This network, like any
systematic whole, then runs the risk of detaching from its point of origin.
III. WHEN NETWORK EFFECTS DEFEAT SUBSTANTIVE QUALITY
A. HISTORY ENDS AS ONE LEGAL NETWORK GOES GLOBAL
Given the network character of legal systems, globally expanded
transmission of information and activity dependent on law (such as commerce
and finance) has tended to cause the first-starter jurisdiction to gain network
dominance. This occurred for U.S. law (sometimes referred to more inclusively
as “Anglo-American,” law, stressing the relationship by history and language
with the prior leader in the field157) during the late twentieth century thanks to
the collapse of the Soviet economic model and dramatic growth in international
trade, finance, and data transfers marking the latest phase of globalization.158
The process was often referred to as a “convergence” 159 of laws globally, but it
is difficult to find any aspect of U.S. law that changed through adjustment to
foreign law during the period, 160 so it would be better characterized as an
extraterritorial diffusion of the U.S. (or Anglo-American) network of legal
concepts and solutions. Ironically, the economically-oriented legal literature did
not understand this trend as a market phenomenon—in which the dominant
network took over competing networks—but in an ideal sense as all legal
systems moving toward an effective and efficient ideal law and market structure,
one which the United States just happened to have reached first.161
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WATSON, supra note 30, at 32–35 (“The compilers [of the Codex] were given extensive powers
to collect [imperial legal rulings], to omit any, in whole or in part, that were obsolete or unnecessary, and
to remove contradictions and repetitions…. The [imperial legal rulings] were then to be arranged by
subject matter in titles.”).
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global peace lowered the costs of moving goods. Globalization made a second leap in the late twentieth
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as only the most recent stage of this process, see generally OSTERHAMMEL & PETERSSON, supra note 51.
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successful at the time of the prediction. Before the bursting of the Japanese ‘“bubble economy,’ the main
bank system represented the future … the Japanese bubble burst and the American economy boomed ….
due to its rapid response to global competition, stock market-centered capital market, and the external
monitoring to which stock markets are complementary. The American system then became the apparent
end point of corporate governance evolution, a consensus that appears clearly from the IMF and the World
Bank’s response to the 1997–1998 East Asian financial crisis.”).
161
This is generally the tenor of Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 468 (2001) (“The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the
corporation over its principal competitors is now assured.”). See also Bernard Black, The Core Institutions
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This transition to the twenty-first century displayed history’s largest
confluence of power and available information,162 and it was flowing out from
the U.S. culture, economy and legal systems, not only from Disneyland,
McDonalds, and Starbucks, 163 but also from financial systems based on
securities exchanges, 164 and business models chopping and dicing rights and
risks through securitization and derivatives-based hedging strategies. 165 It
included incentive-based legal solutions ranging from contingent fees to
independent directors and stock-option compensation for executives. 166
Principles of economic policy crafted in the U.S. were spread to international
organizations,167 while solutions worked out by U.S. law firms for their clients
became the global standards,168 and naturally these were expressed in English,
preferably using the U.S. dollar as the value of reference.169

that Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS. LAW. 1565 (2000) (“My goal … to explain the … strong
markets in countries, like the United States … to offer a guide to reforms that could strengthen securities
markets in other countries … that don't now have them.”).
162
BALDWIN, supra note 158, at 82 (“For example, the amount of information transmitted by
telecommunications during the whole of 1986 could be transmitted in just two-thousandths of a second
in 1996. The increase in the volume of information between 2006 and 2007 was vastly greater than the
sum of all information transmitted in the previous decade.”).
163
See, e.g., Reinhold Wagnleitner, No Commodity Is Quite So Strange As This Thing Called Cultural
Exchange: The Foreign Politics of American Pop Culture Hegemony, 46 AMERIKASTUDIEN/AMERICAN
STUDIES 443, 462 (2001) (“This diffusion of the U.S. model is a result of the enormous power of the
United States' government, economy, and American media policies. After the breakdown of the Soviet
Union, this pattern seems to have been adopted nearly everywhere . . . . Based on the comforting
hegemonic position of American popular culture industries, their undisputed competitiveness in all areas
of communication, and the attractiveness of the entertainment product, the U.S. has consistently insisted,
since the Second World War, on the opening of all communication markets and their privatization—
resulting in a global erosion of the public space.”).
164
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3–5 (2001).
165
Ewald Engelen & Anna Glasmacher, The Waiting Game: How Securitization Became the Solution
for the Growth Problem of the Eurozone, 22 COMPETITION & CHANGE 165, 177 (2018). (“While the
number of SME securitizations in Germany increased sizably between 1998 and 2008, the total stock of
German securitizations remained rather subdued given the size of the German economy . . . . By contrast,
in both the UK and the Netherlands, securitization had by 2008 become a widely used financial technique,
predominantly to fund residential mortgages.”).
166
On the global acceptance in various forms of independent directors, see DAN W. PUCHNIAK,
HARALD BAUM & LUKE NOTTAGE, INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL
AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2017).
167
Perhaps the two most prominent (and rather notorious) of these are the “Washington Consensus”
and the philosophy of “shareholder value.” On the first, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS 91 (2002); on the second, see LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC Ch. 2 (2012).
168
John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms in International Business
Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 45–54 (2007). At the turn of the century, U.S. and
U.K. law firms were expanding dramatically, opening up offices in every major city in the world through
mergers with local firms and lateral hires. “The crucial question is to what extent international law firms
are merely exporting English or New York law as opposed to engaging in the practice of local law . . . .
The large law firm's main alliance is with the Anglo-American nexus, which is composed of, among other
things, neo-liberal democracy and respect for property rights as exemplified in the Washington
Consensus.” Id. at 54.
169
ESWAR S. PRASAD, THE DOLLAR TRAP: HOW THE U.S. DOLLAR TIGHTENED ITS GRIP ON GLOBAL
FINANCE 5 (2014). The network effects of the U.S. dollar present a strong example of the kind of systemic
and size-linked strength of networks examined in this Article. Supported by solid institutions and the
leading economy coming out of World War II, the U.S. dollar tipped into becoming the world’s reserve
currency, and challengers like the euro and the renminbi have unsuccessfully challenged its reign. Prasad
documents that even when the U.S. sub-prime crisis brought condemnation on “Anglo-American” finance,
“[a] wave of money flooded into the U.S. . . . U.S. investors pulled their capital back home from abroad,
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Governments around the world strove to increase the dynamism of their
economies to emulate the leading power that was the U.S., and one key strategy
was to make their own law compatible with the U.S. legal platform standard.170
The platform that was the U.S. legal system—ranging from constitutionally
protected individual rights and property to trust models for securitization—
became so powerful that some commentators at the time could see no viable
outside, and announced with Hegelian certainty that world history had reached
its pinnacle in capitalism and liberal democracy, an end of history. 171 This
assertion was not without supporting evidence. Solutions, procedures, and
conceptual patterns found in U.S. law became industry standards,172 actively
carried forward by U.S. multinationals, industry associations, and international
bodies that focused efforts on recommending “best practices” to developing
countries and drafting model legislation and treaties incorporating general
patterns of U.S. law. 173 While Chinese children watched Disney films and
somewhat older siblings drank Starbucks lattes, their U.S. educated parents
gauged the quality of investments using U.S. standards of corporate governance,
a belief companies should serve shareholder value, and a conviction in Fama’s
efficient market doctrine.174

while foreign investors in search of a safe haven for their money added to the flows.” Tooze makes a
similar observation: “[What occurred] was the opposite of the crisis that had been forecast. Not a dollar
glut but an acute dollar-funding shortage. The dollar did not plunge, it rose.” ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED:
HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISES CHANGED THE WORLD 8 (2018). Years after that crisis, sixty-four
percent of global foreign exchange reserves still remained in U.S. dollars. ESWAR S. PRASAD, GAINING
CURRENCY xviii (2017). Commodities such as oil, plastics, gold and base metals have traditionally been
priced in U.S. dollars. NEIL C. SCHOFIELD, COMMODITY DERIVATIVES: MARKETS AND APPLICATIONS 28,
44, 81, 117 (2007).
170
The European Union presented a strong example of this. See, e.g., Implementing the Framework
for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 final (May 11, 1999); see also Final Report of the
Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, (Feb. 15, 2001),
https://spk.gov.tr/Sayfa/Dosya/114.
171
FUKUYAMA, supra note 19, at 338–339.
172
For example, nearly every aspect of U.S. securities regulation and securities market design became
the global norm, from the division of law into primary market and secondary market regulation to the use
of central securities depositors for the indirect holding of securities and their transfer on account by book
entry. A master agreement governing over-the-counter derivatives transactions was carried forward
aggressively by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), insuring that financial
institutions could transact on the same terms globally. “[M] any sovereign nations, including the US, UK,
France, Germany, Switzerland and Japan, have modified their corporate bankruptcy statutes by adopting
ISDA’s ‘model netting act’.” Bruce G. Carruthers, Diverging Derivatives: Law, Governance and Modern
Financial Markets, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 386, 393 (2013). With respect to ISDA, I thank Katharina Pistor
for the observation that some U.S. industries preferred not to spread American law, instead favoring their
own private solutions, like the ISDA Master Agreement, which gave them additional flexibility and
control.
173
See the discussion of the “Washington Consensus” in STIGLITZ, supra note 168, at 91 and the
influence on model commercial law in described by Isaak Dore and James DeFranco. Isaak I. Doore &
James E. DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on
the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 56–58 (1982).
174
On U.S. culture in China, see, e.g., Peter Gries et al., Hollywood in China: How American Popular
Culture Shapes Chinese Views of the “Beautiful Imperialist” – An Experimental Analysis, 224 THE
CHINA Q. 1070, 180 (2015). The faith in U.S. ideas on the operation of the free market can be seen in the
many works by Chinese scholars that refer to state control of market forces as “financial repression.” For
example, see Yiping Huang & Xu Wang, Building an Efficient Financial System in China: A Need for
Stronger Market Discipline, 12 ASIAN ECON. POL’Y R. 188 (2017).
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Observers did not examine this ubiquitous acceptance of U.S. law in terms
of network dominance.175 As we have seen, Klausner and others were at the time
making such arguments about how Delaware corporate law could dominate the
law of, say, New York.176 But analysis of the global impact of U.S. law took a
different approach. Arguments were made that U.S. law was dominant because
it was inherently superior in substance, which of course greatly facilitated its
acceptance and imitation, 177 kickstarting a network tipping point. The most
famous argument of this type was made by a team of economists focusing on
corporate and securities laws. 178 Their argument was that common law,
originating in Britain and spread through colonization to the U.S., was an
important key to economic development.179 This “legal origin” theory asserted
that countries using common law could better protect investors, which was a
precondition for healthy capital markets, which were in turn a precondition for
economic development.180 The expectation was in this way created that common
law was good for the economy.
As we have seen,181 Norman conquerors used the common law in England
to co-opt the subjugated English into making co-pronouncement of the law
imposed upon them, rather than risking revolt against the new sovereigns by
imposing law from the top. This is strangely paralleled by the 1970s shift of the
U.S. government, as explained by Krippner, toward stressing that market forces
should decide whether social spending is permissible. 182 This shift removed
difficult and delicate decision-making on the allocation of social entitlements
from the sovereign’s hand and made it a factor of “neutral” market forces. As a
fundamentally procedural system, common law parallels in structure “the
market” in which a broad framework should allow opposing forces to compete

175
Viewed from our current perspective it is clear that Pistor was examining network effects using
the terminology of “standardization” and focusing largely on human—rather than conceptual—networks
of talent that tend to strength the leading legal system globally. As she observed, “Once a regulatory
system has established a head start over others, it benefits from rules that can be interpreted and applied
only within that regulatory regime. Superior legal expertise of attorneys and judges is an important asset
that is not easily emulated by other jurisdictions.” Pistor, supra note 4, at 104.
176
See Part II.A.
177
As Grewal explains, the expectations of users play an important role in allowing a dominant
network to reach the tipping point in which adopting it becomes inevitable. GREWAL, supra note 11, at
25. These expectations are crafted by opinion leaders like leading scholars and international organizations.
178
This team is usually referred to as LLSV, which stands for Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny.
179
From a terminological perspective, the “common law” argument was somewhat problematic
because LLSV generally gave higher ratings to U.S. law although there is very little U.S. common law.
In the area of securities regulation, federal courts do interpret federal statutes, but that type of statutory
interpretation is not generally understood as common law. “Common law” arises in the U.S. primarily in
the U.S. states, so that we may speak of New York or Delaware common law. Moreover, U.K. common
law had its greatest influence over colonies (the U.S. had very few colonies), but colonies were built
mainly with statutory law. Thus, the term “common law” was thrown about with only a vague and mostly
colloquial understanding of its meaning.
180 See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997).
The connection between financial development and economic development is now seen as much more
problematic than it was prior to 2008. See Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes & Ugo Panizza, Too Much
Finance? (IMF, Working Paper No. 12/161, 2012).
181
See GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 31, at 239.
182
As Kripper explains, “rather than decisions about allocation moving into the strong light of public
debate and discussion where a new social consensus could be forged, these decisions drifted ever further
into the shadowy realms of the market.” GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS 20 (2011).
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within it. The assertion of common law’s deep superiority in this way buttressed
the global spread of a privatized economy in which the market impact of private
wealth was given the privilege of setting public policy,183 and the assertion of
common law’s substantive superiority was well-received by both academia and
policy-making bodies. 184
The argument for common law’s superiority was strengthened because the
theory appeared to supply a concrete, scientific explanation for the real and
palpable dominance of a U.S. economic and legal model so pervasive that to
some it appeared to be the culmination of history. Grewal demonstrates that a
shift to market choice and away from governmental control raises network
effects over citizen choice within a sovereign body. 185 The embrace of the
market domestically and of the common law spirit internationally thus placed
network (market) forces above sovereign choice, but the possibility that the
belief in common law superiority was essentially a wave of network dominance
was never seriously considered.
Given the historical facts, the proclamation of common law superiority
contained a deep irony, in that it tacitly proposed that all jurisdictions should
stimulate their economies by accepting transplant of a foreign, common-laworigin legal system, which was superior exactly because thirteenth century
England had refused to accept transplant of the much more sophisticated Roman
law legal system. Aside from the truth that the U.S. and the U.K. had done well
for themselves, few substantive arguments supporting common law’s
proclaimed superiority were offered. General assertions were made on the basis
of relatively marginal point-by-point comparisons to “civil law, and particularly
French civil law,” which was said “have both the weakest investor protections
and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law
countries.”186 LLSV did not raise the potential increase of private power while
asserting that common law was flexibile, and that this derived from the action
of savvy judges. 187 These arguments were given comparative weight by

183
“In the Keynesian era, the state’s assumption of responsibility for sustaining growth exposed state
managers to criticism, but also allowed the state to encourage normative commitments that legitimated
economic policies, especially those aimed at securing broad participation in the labor market and a more
equal distribution of resources across society. Under neoliberal economic management, in contrast, the
state’s avoidance of responsibility for economic outcomes may shield policymakers from public scrutiny,
but it does not build a foundation for state action. As the state has withdrawn support from the goals of
full employment and steadily improving distributional outcomes, the basis of consent is no longer clear.”
Id at 148.
184
The World Bank incorporated LLSV findings into its 2004 “Doing Business Report.” WORLD
BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION xiv (2004). (“Common law countries
regulate the least. Countries in the French civil law tradition regulate the most …. [h]eavier regulation
brings bad outcomes.”).
185
GREWAL, supra note 11, at 247.
186 La Porta et al., supra note 180, at 1131, 1149.
187 As LLSV remarks: “Legal rules in the common law system are usually made by judges, based on
precedents and inspired by general principles such as fiduciary duty or fairness …. In contrast, laws in
civil law systems are made by legislatures, and judges are not supposed to go beyond the statutes and
apply ‘smell tests’ or fairness opinions. As a consequence, a corporate insider who finds a way not
explicitly forbidden by the statutes to expropriate outside investors can proceed without fear of an adverse
judicial ruling.” Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 3, 9 (2000).
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insertion in a quantitative index rating investor protection.188 It is hard to find a
substantive assertion about law made by LLSV that has not been refuted.
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the legal origin theory is that it
successfully marketed network effects as substantive legal quality. In response
to the assertions made by LLSV, leading legal scholars demonstrated the
theory’s lack of support in the law. Milhaupt and Pistor faulted LLSV for a lack
of analytical perspective, use of limited data, and failure to recognize reciprocal
influence. They found that when such a theory treats “a legal institution as a
black box [it] implies that the core of any legal system, in particular the strategic
use of law by key players, is ignored,” that LLSV strengthened their arguments
by limiting themselves to “recent economic performance—mostly using data
from the 1990s,” rather than looking at a more comprehensive period, and
generally stressed that the causality between good law and economic
development is often reciprocal (strong economies may seek strong law). 189
Coffee pointed out that, “[i]ronically, it is the most statutory (and thus civil-lawlike) aspects of corporate governance in common law countries whose value the
LLS&V research seems to affirm.”190 Indeed, far from being flexible and courtcentred, U.S. securities regulation is expressed in hundreds of pages of statutes
and thousands of pages of rules,191 with judicial decisions playing a minor role.
Coffee also observed that for LLSV, “small and (to lawyers) inconsequential
legal differences were assigned great weight and presented as the minority
shareholders’ shield against exploitation by the majority . . . [so that] at times
this inquiry resembled the medieval quest for the philosopher's stone that could
turn lead into gold.”192 Armour, Deakin, Lele, and Siems explained that items of
law included in LLSV’s index of governance were “open to the charge of
vagueness.” 193 Roe explained that historical events had made the AngloAmerican platform dominant, as the two world wars fought in Continental
Europe strongly skewed European development. 194 Following each war, the
rebuilding of public and private infrastructure was better financed by banks
rather than equity markets, 195 leaving their market bank-centered, and the
division of Germany into two countries led West Germany to champion the
rights of labor over capital in order not to give East Germany an advantage in
courting the working class.196

188
“When the coding of LLSV’s ‘shareholder rights’ indices were checked by independent experts,
numerous coding errors were revealed, to the extent that the principal results are no longer regarded as
being entirely robust, even by members of the LLSV research network.” John Armour et al., How Do
Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker
Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 585 (2009).
189
MILHAUPT, supra note 145, at 23 and 6.
190
John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 249
(2007).
191 A very compact version of just the Securities Act of 1933 (regulating primary market sales of
securities) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (regulating secondary market sales of securities)
before the enactment of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 consisted of over 300 pages.
The rules written for the ’33 and ’34 Acts (again prior to adding over 1,000 pages for the Dodd Frank Act
rules) consisted of about 2,000 pages of densely packed regulations.
192 Coffee, supra note 190, at 242–43.
193
Armour, supra note 188, at 604.
194 Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006).
195 Id. at 502.
196 Id. at 501.
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If one really looks at origin, the plain history of the U.K. financial system
shows that William III of Orange transplanted the (civil law) Dutch financial
infrastructure from The Netherlands to Britain after taking the English crown in
1688.197 Data on the growth of British finance also show that the insular nature
of the U.K. stimulated inward capital flows and market development during
Continental wars, which consistently led investors to seek out the British market
as a safe haven for Continental funds,198 and this later applied to New York as
well.199 Finally, an empirical analysis undertaken by Armour, Deakin, Mollica,
and Siems examining twenty countries during the period studied by LLSV
showed insufficient link between investor protection and securities market
development to support the LLSV thesis.200
Despite substantive refutation, the legal origin theory is still seriously and
uncritically used by some today.201 This probably has much to do with the fact
that despite leading the world into major corporate and financial crisis in 2001
and 2008, the U.S. legal system continues to present the most pervasively used
network.202 As discussed in Part II.B, U.S. firms had spread to every corner of
the world, and found it efficient to bring their law with them.203 As the subsisting
center of world power with an enormous military guaranteeing stability, the U.S.
and its currency are the obvious choice as safe haven investments in times of
political instability. 204 The ability of U.S. and English law to serve as raw

197 See Larry Neal, The Integration and Efficiency of the London and Amsterdam Stock Markets in
the Eighteenth Century, 47 J. ECON. HIST. 97, 98–99 (1987) (“William brought with him numerous
financial advisors and military contractors from Holland. Many were Jews and Huguenots who were
eager to apply in a relatively backward England the financial techniques and institutions that had been
developed over the past century in Amsterdam.”); See also Eric S. Schubert, Innovations, Debts, and
Bubbles: International Integration of Financial Markets in Western Europe, 1688-1720, 48 J. ECON. HIST.
299, 300–04 (1988) (“After the Glorious Revolution of 1688 England made important changes in its
underdeveloped system of public finance and credit …. the administration of William III imported Dutch
techniques of finance …. the Bank of England [was founded] in 1694 …. [and] [t]he modernization of
the financial system gave London the opportunity to develop into a major financial center on par with
Amsterdam.”).
198
Such capital flight caused the birth of the London Stock Exchange. See RANALD MICHIE, THE
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY 23–25 (2001); See also Ann M. Carlos & Larry Neal,
Amsterdam and London as Financial Centers in the Eighteenth Century, 18 FIN. HIST. REV. 21, 37 (2011).
199 See ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON
WOODS TO THE 1990'S 39 (1996) (discussing the flow of funds into New York during the Second World
War).
200
John Armour et al., Law and Financial Development: What We are Learning from Time-Series
Evidence, 2009 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1435, 1438 (2009).
201
See, e.g., David Yermack, FinTech in Sub-Saharan Africa: What Has Worked Well, and What
Hasn’t, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25007, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3240899 (“I document far greater adoption of social media, digital currency,
ride sharing, and other FinTech applications in countries with a common law legal heritage compared to
those with a civil law system, suggesting that legal origin plays a critical role in setting the stage for
growth through entrepreneurship in the developing world.”).
202
Tooze describes how the U.S. Federal Reserve, despite being at the epicenter of the global
financial crisis’ cause as a regulator, was viewed and indeed performed as the only globally competent
actor able to stem the collapse of the global financial system. Tooze, supra note 169, at 205–214.
203
The reference here is to transactional law, such as concepts of contract and property law. It is wellknown that multinational activity intentionally seeks to decrease burdens under local tax, labor and
environmental law, among others by regulatory arbitrage. With respect to the history of U.S. multinational
firms and the political and legal elements affecting the growth and operation of multinationals; see also
PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 67, at 15–26, 33–44.
204
See, e.g., BENJAMIN J. COHEN, THE GEOGRAPHY OF MONEY 95 (1998) (“[T]he motivations . . .
are easily appreciated …. economies of scale, or reduced transactions costs, to be gained from
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material for the complex financial transactions that favour the wealthiest persons
have helped them hold their network dominance today.205 The entire package
offered by affiliation with the U.S. legal system thus included the networking
qualities of a platform in which one strength feeds back on another, including
the systematic benefits of being tied into the strongest country, currency, and
economy in the world, all of which affirm the benefits of this network. When
making decisions to stimulate social and economic development, it is important
to understand that network effects—rather than the asserted inherent greatness
of the common law—are foremost in making the U.S. legal system attractive.
B. NETWORK DOMINANCE AND FRUSTRATED DEVELOPMENT
Network externalities display “winner-take-all” properties because a tipping
point is reached at which members of smaller networks must join the larger
(more liquid) network or be isolated. 206 Network logic means each spurt of
growth and influence increases the winner’s network externalities, attracting
even more users.207 When a legal system dominates due to network effects while
offering neither the absolute best nor the best local solutions, costs suffered from
network effects go beyond impairing local autonomy and cultural heterogeneity.
They include potential frustration of all forward development. As Pistor
observed nearly two decades ago, “[t]he standardization of ‘best practices’ or
‘efficient’ law replaces the Schumpeterian process of ‘creative destruction’ with
the ideal of the ‘perfect construction’ of law.”208 She and her coauthors, when
documenting the “transplant effect,” showed how the adoption of law from a
leading network law can introduce legal institutions that remain unused by the
developing country due to a lack of demand,209 much like heavy industry and
infrastructural “white elephant” projects left behind by ill-conceived industrial
development projects.
If a given system of law is valued for its network benefits although the
underlying quality of the law has serious flaws in meeting social needs,

concentrating cross-border activities in just one or at most a few currencies with broad transactional
networks”); Benjamin J. Cohen, America’s Interest in Dollarization, in MONETARY UNIONS AND HARD
PEGS: EFFECTS ON TRADE, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND STABILITY 289–302 (Volbert Alexander,
Jacques Mélitz & George M. von Furstenberg eds., 2004). Even when engaged in a trade war with the
U.S., China remains compelled to invest in and support the U.S. economy through purchase of treasury
bills. See, e.g., Jeff Cox, China’s ‘Self-Destructive Nuclear Option’ in Trade War: Selling US Treasury
Bonds, CNBC (May 13, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/13/chinas-self-destructive-nuclearoption-in-trade-war-selling-us-treasury-bonds.html.
205
KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL 168-69 (2019). Some of the strengths of the common
law examined by Pistor are indeed substantive, but she does not assert—and no legal theorist could
seriously argue—that common law is inherently superior because it tends to allow the wealthiest and best
represented persons to gain meaningful advantages over others of modest means.
206
GREWAL, supra note 11, at 36 (“A member of one network faces overwhelming indirect force
when . . . opportunity costs [not belonging to the dominant network] mount to such an extent that she is
deprived of real opportunities for cooperation in any network except the dominant one”).
207
See the discussion in ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE:
WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 149 (2014). See Robert H.
Frank & Phillip J. Cook, Winner-Take-All Markets (Pol. Econ. Research Group, Paper No. 18, 1991) (an
early analysis for winter-take-all markets), http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsperg_ppe.
208
Pistor, supra note 4, at 98.
209
Berkowitz et al., supra note 14, at 179–187 (discussing unreceptive transplants).
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jurisdictions shifting into the dominant network may experience damaging
shocks when the underlying flaws erupt, and the cost of such shocks can
outweigh the benefits of belonging to the dominant network. The body politic,
may, so to speak, gradually decay and degrade internally while the government
binges on “fast law.”
For example, adoption of a common law “trust” in civil law China to
facilitate the securitization and sale of claims on mortgages led to significant
confusion on the distinction between property and contract rights held by various
parties in Chinese transactions.210 The Chinese adoption of a well-known U.K.style mandatory bid rule, which had to be applied in a way to accommodate
multi-class share structures, made the provision useless.211 The use of each of
the foregoing ‘solutions’ might have obviated or impeded the development of a
mechanism appropriately designed to meet local needs. Law from a dominant
network can also be rendered inactive by local interpretations or lack of use,
which is what happened to the U.K.-style code to regulate hostile takeovers
adopted in Hong Kong in 1992. It has never been applied in the contemplated
manner because no hostile takeover has taken place.212 The network demands of
the international investment industry forced Germany to adopt an “audit
committee” in its code of corporate governance although the German two-tier
board structure meant that each stock corporation already had a powerful and
independent body charged with vetting the company’s financial disclosure.213
While examples of poor local fit for transplanted law are abundant, there is
also good evidence that today’s global model, U.S. law creates instability
through its emphasis on private action and fundamental reliance on the incentive
of self-enrichment driving market forces. The “dot.com” bubble and its collapse
was largely a function of U.S. accounting and compensation practices.214 The
“global financial crisis” was largely a function of liberal U.S.-led securitization
of the credit markets and unregulated use of derivatives as a primary form of
risk management.215 Incentives leading up to both crises were fed by the U.S.
model of excessive performance-based compensation paid to senior
executives.216 Most recently, the U.S. practice of direct democracy through the
media (as opposed to parliamentary, managed democracy by dour professionals)

210
See Lyu Kai, Re-Clarifying China’s Trust Law: Characteristics and New Conceptual Basis, 36
LOY. L.A. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 447, 452–470 (2014).
211
See WANG CHAO, SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION LAW IN TAKEOVER OF CHINESE LISTED
COMPANIES: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES Chapter IV (2019) (doctoral dissertation on
file with author and the Graduate School of The Chinese University of Hong Kong.).
212
See David C. Donald, Evolutionary Development in Hong Kong of Transplanted UK-Origin
Takeover Rules, COMPARATIVE TAKEOVER REGULATION: GLOBAL AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES
(Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
213
See ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: TEXTS AND CASES
ON THE LAWS GOVERNING CORPORATIONS IN GERMANY, THE UK AND THE USA 540–542 (2d ed. 2018).
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has allowed data analytics combined with social networking to create serious
challenges to self-government.217
When substantive flaws in a leading legal system cannot be effectively
raised because network effects are strong and continuing, it becomes very
difficult to find the way forward. 218 The dilemma is even more grave for a
developing country adopting new law, if this law is judged primarily on its
network effects. Law with strong international network benefits could
potentially remain in place even though unresponsive to social needs. Although
such arrangements have been effective in some primitive regimes,219 colonial
rule, 220 and modern authoritarian governments, 221 they present serious
disadvantages. A legal system that does not co-develop with its society presents
problems of legitimacy. As Dworkin observes:
[T]he best defense of political legitimacy—the right of a
political community to treat its members as having obligations
in virtue of collective community decisions—is to be found not
in the hard terrain of contracts or duties of justice or obligations
of fair play that might hold among strangers … but in the more
fertile ground of fraternity, community, and their attendant
obligations.222
The word “community” entails that a group enjoys mutual communication
of shared values, which corresponds to Luhmann’s view that a society’s trust in
the power of government can exist “mainly because this trust has foundation in
the chances for effective communication” about specific rules triggering state
power. 223 Valcke also posits engaging communication as the foundation of law
in her own and others’ legal theories.224 For Rawls, the values underlying such
a legal community have an assumed “publicity,” as citizens “suppose that
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everyone will know about these principles all that he would know.”225 This is
the point Eisenberg uses to overcome the problem of retroactivity in case law.
The community sharing a legal system is privy to the information flows in that
system regarding both input notions of justice from society and output legal rules
from professionals, so they essentially know what judgment will be reached. As
Calebresi puts it, “the legal fabric, and the principles that form it, are good
approximations of one aspect of popular will, of what a majority in some sense
desires.”226 While the legal theorists cited in this paragraph are not all making
identical points, each of them refers to a back-and-forth relationship in which
law and community communicate. In a jurisdiction with a socially legitimate
legal system, lawmaking will reflect those values generally held by residents as
it responds to their demand for judgments or enactments. However, in a
jurisdiction that adopts law taken from the dominant network, the “liquidity” of
individual concepts and principles used in such network may be seen to
outweigh legitimate reflection of values. An economic analysis may create the
plausible impression that the adopted network is ideal because it is understood
to be the best solution for a posited economic goal of society, but – even
assuming the aim of a given society could be reduced to economic principles –
the synthetic transplantation of that law into a new context does not reflect what
we know about the origin, systematic constitution and legitimacy of legal
systems.
Without the mutual flow of information containing community expectations
and the reaction of the platform’s network managers, law would lose both its
ability for spontaneous renewal in reaction to local social needs and much of its
legitimacy. If, with Luhmann, we see “society as a comprehensive system of all
communication in an environment . . . the legal system also is a system which is
part of society and which performs in society . . . [and the] legal system simply
requires communication to work.” 227 The institutional platform of the legal
system consists, in substance, of this information (at various stages of processing)
and the methods used to process and apply it. Network efficiency evaluations of
a legal system do not examine the correspondence of social and legal content,
but rather the coordination advantages (“liquidity”) of the legal elements used to
coordinate actors’ behavior.228 These network benefits are linguistic in that they
participate in the dominant coordination system, and a focus on this structural
quality makes the systemic social content of law seem less relevant.229 Put in
market rather than linguistic terms, one does not think about possible
merchandise a trader might buy with the dollar or euro she is trading, but only
the systemic value of the dollar or euro within the market network. The
underlying substance remains secondary to the value of currency in the market.
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By contrast, an analysis of law using Luhmann’s concept of the “structural
coupling” would make it possible to isolate the specific points at which social
pressure necessitates creation of a legal concept or group of concepts. An
analysis of a law’s quality that evaluates the efficiency of structural couplings
could help a developing country ensure that the law it adopts meets local needs.
This type of activity is exercised by socially sensitive members of the judiciary,
such as the British Law Lord, Baron Tom Denning, who introduced or promoted
concepts like “fraud on the minority”230 and “promissory estoppel”231 to meet
social needs.
The hypothesis that law in the development context is more often judged by
network effects could be tested against the current evolution of reduced respect
for U.S. law and legal solutions. 232 U.S. prestige should logically have been
reduced by the governance and financial crises mentioned above together with
related losses of geopolitical authority from unprovoked war,233 questionable
positions on human rights, and abdication of global leadership on issues like
climate change,234 as well as the lack of readiness and response of the federal
government in the Covid-19 crisis.235 If the popularity of the U.S. rests mainly
on network effects (as opposed to substantive quality), U.S. law and legal
solutions should become less valuable for foreign and domestic users as
economic and geopolitical events diminish the strength of its combinatorial
network elements, even if the substantive quality of U.S. law remains
unchanged.236 If at the anecdotal level there appears to be a drop in use of U.S.
law corresponding to a loss of platform prestige despite no degradation of
substantive quality in U.S. law, the matter would merit quantitative study to
attempt a more precise evaluation.237
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CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that, in the international development context, law can
be assessed both by its responsiveness to social needs and by the strength of its
conceptual network, but the two approaches can yield conflicting results. This
application of network theory to law’s perceived value in an international
context is new. Klausner has applied the approach to jurisdictional competition
within the U.S., but his theory was not used in the international development
context. When focusing on international development, Pistor has examined the
interaction of local needs and standardized, “best practices” in great detail,
implicitly recognizing network value while not attempting to isolate network
effects. Grewal extensively explores network power, but does not apply his
findings to the diffusion of law. Responsiveness of law to societal expectations
is shown to be a characteristic of law’s substantive quality in the systems theory
of Luhmann. This Article shows that similar analyses with different theoretical
approaches are undertaken by Baker, Eisenberg, and Glenn.
The combination of these angles of analysis shows legal systems to have
two interactive facets, with the first facet consisting of a process in which
societal needs are registered and answered dynamically by the legal profession’s
ordering of concepts and remedies, and the second being a textual structure of
such legal concepts and remedies having network effects for the user’s
interaction with the world. Because these concepts and remedies exist as a
network, their value increases with an expanding mass of persons who
understand and use them. They tend to become more valuable as the network’s
user base grows – even if underlying quality measured by responsiveness to
social needs were to decrease.
The two facets of the legal system can thus exhibit opposing tendencies,
with structural network value increasing as relational value to social needs
decreases. Interaction of these two tendencies creates a serious risk that
increasing focus on growing network effects will eventually eclipse concern for
a decreasing underlying connection to social needs. This is because connection
to social needs will nag for constant adjustment and renovation of the legal
system, but network effects will grow with the number of users and recorded
uses in a system that over time remains largely stable and unchanged. Looking
at network growth in time, rather than space, this relationship will be obvious to
most: old, well-settled law is respected by many, but can be ‘out of touch’.
Perhaps that is why Thomas Jefferson’s famous 1816 prescription for the U.S.
Constitution both rings true and has never been heeded except in circumstances
where networks have completely broken down in civil war, social or economic
crisis:
And, lastly, let us provide in our constitution for its revision at
stated periods . . . . Each generation is as independent of the one
preceding, as that was of all which had gone before. It has, then,
like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it
believes most promotive of its own happiness; consequently, to
accommodate to the circumstances in which it finds itself, that
received from its predecessors: and it is for the peace and good
of mankind, that a solemn opportunity of doing this every
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nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the
constitution.238
Many instances of legal system network expansion and contraction can be
found in history. A fresh example is the recent “end of history” as the U.S.
economic structure and legal system were understood to have reached the
pinnacle of human aspirations at the close of the twentieth century. Like a
language or a currency, a legal system will replace others once its network power
(the “liquidity” of its constitutive concepts and procedures) reaches sufficient
scale. As the U.S. legal system was intertwined with a dominant economy, a
dominant currency, a dominant language, and a dominant military power, with
legal concepts facilitating an increase in private autonomy for the wealthiest, it
attracted an increasing number of users among world leaders. The network
incentives connected with adoption of concepts found in U.S. law explain why
the law of many jurisdictions could be seen to “converge” on the U.S. model at
the end of the twentieth century as minor networks were absorbed by the leader.
Membership—achieved by adopting legal solutions similar to those found in
U.S. law—not only allowed users to transact with the platform’s native members
but also gave them the connectivity and reputational standing that comes with
being a part of the leading network. As the network grew, each new member
strengthened its position and alternatives outside of it became less viable.
The U.S. legal system’s strength at the turn of the century was assisted by
an Aeneid-like fable that the U.S. securities markets traced their strength back to
the Plantagenet King, Henry II, and the legal system of common law he founded.
This story offered by scholars from the world’s most prominent universities was
then adopted by the world’s leading development institution. Belief in the
supremacy of legal origin for development was not initially weakened by its lack
of support in either history or the technical substance of common law and
securities regulation. Refutations of the origin fable by leading legal scholars
included observations on the weaknesses of the legal origin supremacy theory’s
data, definitions, understanding of law, and causal links to development.
Nevertheless, even after the common law origin supremacy argument was in
substance refuted, it continued to be popular during the period that the U.S. legal
and economic systems remained preeminent. This appears to be due to network
effects, and invites further analysis.
Going forward, developing countries, development agencies, and legal
experts should be keenly aware of the value of the underlying complementarity
of law and social needs as well as the utility of using legal solutions that are
readily recognized and understood by the largest number of users. Especially
because social needs will tend to present a periodic, unsatisfied “irritant” to an
aging or imported legal system enjoying network prestige, any lawmaker should
keep the two sides of law, and their tendency to diverge, firmly in mind. “Fast
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law” may be cheap and popular, but it could have detrimental long-term
consequences for the body politic.

